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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Defendant-Appellant Douglas Colkitt appeals from the 
District Court's award of summary judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiff-Appellee Berckeley Investment Group, Ltd. 
("Berckeley"), and the denial of his own cross-motion for 
summary judgment. Berckeley's claims against Colkitt are 
for breach of contract -- more particularly, Colkitt's refusal 
to convert debentures held by Berckeley into unregistered 
shares of National Medical Financial Services Corp. 
("National Medical"), as required by the Offshore Convertible 
Securities Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement") the two 
entered into in 1996. Colkitt has interposed various 
defenses, including the allegation that Berckeley violated 
several registration provisions of the securities laws of the 
United States, thereby voiding his obligations to convert the 
debentures under the Agreement. 
 
Berckeley's complaint makes additional claims against 
the broker of the transaction -- Shoreline Pacific 
Institutional Finance, the Institutional Division of the 
Financial West Group ("Shoreline") -- claiming breaches of 
contract and fiduciary duty. Shoreline, in turn, has made 
cross-claims against Colkitt for breach of contract and 
contractual indemnification. The claims by and against 
Shoreline remain unresolved. 
 
While we recognize the benefits of the expeditious 
resolution of the parties' conflict, we nevertheless find that 
this Court, in the absence of the District Court's 
certification of its order as a partial final judgment 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), does not 
have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal in light of the 
pending claims against Shoreline. We therefore refuse 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and remand to the 
District Court for consideration of those factors relevant to 
such certification and, if it deems necessary, compliance 
with Rule 54(b). 
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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL H ISTORY 
 
On May 30, 1996, Colkitt and Berckeley entered into an 
Agreement by which Berckeley purchased forty convertible 
debentures issued by Colkitt at a price of $50,000 each, for 
a total of $2,000,000. The debentures had a term of one 
year and paid interest of 6%, due quarterly. The debentures 
further provided that Berckeley had the unilateral option to 
demand that Colkitt convert each debenture into 
unregistered shares of National Medical, a company led by 
Colkitt as the Chairman of its Board of Directors and which 
traded on the Nasdaq Stock Exchange. The number of 
shares converted depended on the price of National Medical 
stock and included a 17% discount from the market price. 
The discount was, in part, because the National Medical 
shares held by Colkitt for the transaction were not 
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
as would be required for sales of those shares within the 
United States by Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 
U.S.C. S 77(e). The Agreement between Colkitt and 
Berckeley was brokered by Shoreline and it was through 
Shoreline that the $2,000,000 eventually passed to Colkitt 
on May 31, 1996. 
 
Berckeley made its first demands for conversion of the 
debentures in September 1996, after the expiration of a 
100-day waiting period required by the Agreement. Colkitt 
initially refused to convert the debentures, but eventually 
acceded to the conversion of 18,320 shares, a small fraction 
of the requested share conversions, in November of 1996. 
No other shares were converted despite Berckeley's 
demands. Colkitt also refused to make interest payments 
on the debentures. 
 
The battle of claims then began. Berckeley filed suit 
against Colkitt, National Medical and Shoreline in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania on August 13, 1997.1 The complaint alleged 
breaches of contract by both Colkitt and National Medical 
and breaches of both fiduciary duty and contract by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court properly took original jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1332(a), as there is complete diversity among 
the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 
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Shoreline. National Medical was eventually dismissed from 
the action and the claims against it are immaterial to this 
appeal. Colkitt filed his answer, affirmative defenses and 
counterclaims on October 17. Shoreline filed a cross-claim 
against Colkitt on December 10. The District Court 
dismissed all of Colkitt's counterclaims on April 1, 1998, 
but Colkitt reasserted those counterclaims not dismissed 
with prejudice in an amended counterclaim complaint, filed 
April 21, 1998. Berckeley filed an answer and affirmative 
defenses to Colkitt's claims on May 13, 1998 and presented 
the first of its motions for summary judgment in October of 
that year. 
 
As discovery progressed, Colkitt filed another set of 
counterclaims and affirmative defenses, together with a 
motion for summary judgment, in April 1999. In response, 
Berckeley filed a second motion for summary judgment in 
July 1999. 
 
On December 7, 1999, the District Court granted 
Berckeley's motion for summary judgment and denied 
Colkitt's, but left open the question of damages. In its 
December 7 Order, the Court noted that "the following 
claims/issues remain for trial: (1) the amount of Berckeley's 
claim for damages due to the breach of contract by Colkitt 
(Count I of the complaint); (2) Berckeley's claims against 
Shoreline Pacific for breach of contract and breach of 
fiduciary duty (Counts II and III of the complaint); and (3) 
Shoreline Pacific's cross-claims against Colkitt for breach of 
contract and contractual indemnity." Recognizing the 
pendency of these claims, the Court sought submissions 
from the parties about how to proceed with trial and 
expressly stated that the "entry of final judgment is 
deferred pending disposition of the remaining claims." 
 
Colkitt's response to the District Court represented that 
he "will shortly file a motion under Rule 54(b) and/or 28 
U.S.C. S 1292(b) to immediately appeal the Court's decision 
regarding the grant of summary judgment on the lack of 
scienter." Berckeley filed a response outlining its 
recommended procedure, including either dispositive 
motions or a trial on damages, the entry of final judgment 
and a one-year stay of the proceedings involving Shoreline. 
The stay was recommended to permit Berckeley the 
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opportunity to collect its damages from Colkitt, thereby 
mitigating its claims against Shoreline and possibly limiting 
Shoreline's indemnification claims against Colkitt. In 
response to these submissions, the District Court entered 
its January 12, 2000 Order, which accepted Berckeley's 
proposed procedures. As to Colkitt's submission, the Court 
stated: "Colkitt indicates that he intends to file a motion for 
leave to take an interlocutory appeal. While we do not 
prejudge any such motion, we do not believe that the record 
reflects the need for an interlocutory appeal." 
 
Following the receipt of motions for final judgment and a 
stay, the District Court entered its March 30, 2000 Order, 
awarding damages to Berckeley in the amount of 
$2,611,075.52. With respect to Colkitt's threatened 
interlocutory appeal, the Court stated the following: "Colkitt 
indicated that he intends to file a motion for leave to take 
an interlocutory appeal. No such motion was filed. Instead, 
Colkitt has filed a motion `for revision of and/or relief from' 
our orders of December 7, 1999 and January 12, 2000. The 
motion in effect is a motion for reconsideration." In fact, 
Colkitt's motion for reconsideration did cite Rule 54(b), but 
neither the text of the motion nor its supporting 
memorandum contained any discussion of Rule 54(b) or 
partial final judgment. 
 
The Court denied the motion for reconsideration and 
granted a one-year stay of the proceedings involving 
Shoreline, the stated purpose of which was "to allow 
Berckeley to obtain a final judgment against Colkitt and 
begin collection efforts, which would reduce or eliminate 
Shoreline's potential liability to Berckeley." The Order went 
on to grant Berckeley's motion for "the entry of final 
judgment" and "directed" the clerk "to enter final judgment 
in favor of Berckeley and against Colkitt . . . ." The Court 
also directed the clerk "to close the file administratively 
during the period of the stay" and stated that"[i]f no 
motion to lift the stay is filed before it expires, the matter 
will be deemed resolved and the case shall be closed." 
 
Colkitt filed a notice of appeal on April 25, 2000. His 
appeal was taken from "the Order and Final Judgment 
entered by the district court on March 30, 2000 and from 
the underlying orders of December 7, 1999 and January 
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12, 2000." In a surreal (though presumably strategic) 
change of course, Colkitt now claims that we do not have 
jurisdiction because the judgment of the District Court was 
not final for purposes of execution or appeal.2 
 
II. DISCUSSION OF LAW 
 
This Court's appellate jurisdiction is conferred and 
limited by Congress's grant of authority. See Sheldon v. Sill, 
49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) ("Courts created by 
statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute 
confers."). In this case, appellate jurisdiction is claimed 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291,3 which states that the 
"courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction from 
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the 
United States . . . ." The clause "final decision" has been 
interpreted to require that all proceedings and claims have 
been terminated in the District Court. "Ordinarily, an order 
which terminates fewer than all claims, or claims against 
fewer than all parties, does not constitute a `final' order for 
purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. S 1291." Carter v. City 
of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 
sub nom., Roe v. Carter, 528 U.S. 1005 (1999); see also 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 431-32 n.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Even had Colkitt not reversed course and argued that our jurisdiction 
was lacking, we nevertheless would be required to examine, sua sponte, 
the basis for our jurisdiction. See Ortiz v. Dodge, 126 F.3d 545, 547 (3d 
Cir. 1997); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 879 
F.2d 1165, 1169 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
3. Though Colkitt threatened to take an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 1292(b) in his response to the District Court's December 7, 
1999 Order, none of the parties now attempt to justify our jurisdiction 
under that provision. This is perhaps because an application for 
interlocutory appeal must be presented to this Court within ten days of 
the District Court's certification of the question of law. Braden v. 
University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 950-51 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc) 
("It is well-settled that the neglect of a party to petition for leave to 
appeal within ten days of the entry of the certification order deprives an 
appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the petition, and that 
[Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure] 26(b) forbids appellate courts to enlarge the 
time for filing such a petition." (citation omitted)). 
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(1956) ("In cases involving multiple parties where the 
alleged liability was joint, a judgment was not appealable 
unless it terminated the action as to all the defendants.") 
(citing Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co. , 148 U.S. 
262, 264 (1893)). 
 
Recognizing, however, that "sound judicial 
administration" could benefit from relaxing the"final 
decision" rule, especially in complex cases involving 
multiple litigants and claims, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b) was first promulgated in 1939 to permit 
the district court to enter "partial" final judgments of less 
than all of the claims. Mackey, 351 U.S. at 433-34. Rule 
54(b) now states the following: 
 
       (b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving 
       Multiple Parties. When more than one claim for relief 
       is presented in an action, whether as a claim, 
       counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or 
       when multiple parties are involved, the court may 
       direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more 
       but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an 
       express determination that there is no just reason for 
       delay and upon an express direction for the entry of 
       judgment. In the absence of such determination and 
       direction, any order or other form of decision, however 
       designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims 
       or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties 
       shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims 
       or parties, and the order or other form of decision is 
       subject to revision at any time before the entry of 
       judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights 
       and liabilities of all the parties. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added). Put more succinctly 
by the Supreme Court, "[i]f the District Court certifies a 
final order on a claim which arises out of the same 
transaction and occurrence as pending claims, and the 
Court of Appeals is satisfied that there has been no abuse 
of discretion, the order is appealable." Cold Metal Process 
Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 452 (1956).4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. While we will typically afford discretion to the District Court's 
determination that there is no just cause for delay, see Gerardi v. 
Pelullo, 
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Berckeley and Shoreline argue on appeal that the District 
Court's Order of March 30, 2000 met the requirements of 
Rule 54(b) and thus we have jurisdiction over this appeal. 
Their argument, however, is weakened by the absence of 
both "an express determination that there is no just reason 
for delay," as literally required by the text of Rule 54(b), and 
a clear indication from the District Court's rulings that it 
was considering all the questions relevant to a Rule 54(b) 
determination.5 
 
Taking first the requirement of an express determination 
that there is no just reason for delay, nowhere in the 
District Court's orders resolving this case did it use the 
words "no just cause for delay" or make any statement of 
an indisputably similar effect. Berckeley and Shoreline 
maintain that we can imply that such a statement was the 
District Court's intent from similar language it used to 
praise expedition in the resolution of the proceedings. 
Specifically, Berckeley points to language in the Court's 
January 12, 2000 Order that acceptance of Berckeley's 
proposal to allow it to seek collection after the entry of 
summary judgment "would not delay an appeal by more 
than one or two months" and that the "matter is close to 
resolution in this court, and may reach resolution if the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16 F.3d 1363, 1368 (3d Cir. 1994); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. 
Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10 (1980), we are presented here with what is solely a 
question of law entitled to plenary review -- our interpretation of the 
requirements of Rule 54(b). See Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 
462 (3d Cir.) (noting that though a motion for a new trial is ordinarily 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, where the outcome of that motion 
relies on "legal precepts," the court would engage in plenary review), 
cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 865 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA 
Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
5. The parties do not contest that the District Court ordered the entry of 
final judgment as to at least one or more, but less than all, claims or 
parties. See Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 611 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[a] 
final 
judgment is `an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the 
course of a multiple claims action' ") (citing Mackey, 351 U.S. at 436). 
While the Court's orders resolve Berckeley's breach of contract claim 
against Colkitt, see Gerardi, 16 F.3d at 1370, the Court has not 
terminated the claims of all parties, and thus it has not entered an 
appealable final order under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. See Carter, 181 F.3d at 
343. 
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suggestion of Berckeley is followed." Neither of these 
statements, however, contains "an express determination 
that there is no just reason for delay," as required by Rule 
54(b). In fact, neither of these statements even implies that 
the District Court was considering the delay caused by an 
immediate appeal of summary judgment, as the Court also 
said in the same paragraph that "we do not prejudge any 
such motion" by Colkitt for an interlocutory appeal. We 
decline to adopt the position that general references to the 
necessity of expedition can substitute for the "express" 
determination required by the Rule. See Bhatla v. U.S. 
Capital Corp., 990 F.2d 780, 786 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
Recognizing the absence of any express statement of"no 
just cause for delay," both Berckeley and Shoreline argue 
that such an "express" statement is not of talismanic 
importance in determining whether this Court has 
jurisdiction after our holding in Carter v. City of 
Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339 (3d Cir. 1999). Their reliance on 
Carter for the proposition that this Court no longer requires 
a district court to make the express determination of Rule 
54(b) is misplaced. In Carter, we were asked to consider 
whether Rule 54(b) required that district courts explain 
their consideration of factors in support of the 
determination that there was no just cause for delay. Id. at 
344-45. We had previously held that a "proper exercise of 
discretion under Rule 54(b) requires the district court to do 
more than just recite the 54(b) formula of `no just reason 
for delay.' The court should clearly articulate the reasons 
and factors underlying its decision to grant 54(b) 
certification." Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 
521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1975); see also Waldorf v. 
Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 611 (3d Cir. 1998).  
 
Carter was concerned with whether the court's failure to 
articulate the factors discussed in Allis-Chalmers divested 
us of appellate jurisdiction, not whether the express 
determination of "no just cause for delay" was required for 
certification under Rule 54(b). Indeed, we noted in Carter 
that the district court in that case had expressly stated 
both that there was no just cause for delay and that it was 
entering a final judgment. Carter, 181 F.3d at 343 n.8. We 
further stated that "the requirements of Rule 54(b) are 
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clearly met," id. at 346, and we went on to hold that Allis- 
Chalmers's requirement of a statement of reasons for a Rule 
54(b) entry of final judgment "stands not as a jurisdictional 
prerequisite but as a prophylactic means of enabling the 
appellate court to ensure that immediate appeal will 
advance the purpose of the rule." Id. at 345.6 Given the 
clarity of our holding in Carter, Berckeley's and Shoreline's 
argument that we intended to hold that an express 
determination of `no just cause for delay' was not a 
jurisdictional prerequisite is unpersuasive. 
 
Indeed, only one court has held that a district court's 
failure to state expressly that there was "no just cause for 
delay" permits the exercise of jurisdiction by the court of 
appeals. In Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, Inc., 
908 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1990), the Fifth Circuit, en banc, 
held that "[i]f the language in the order appealed from, 
either independently or together with related portions of the 
record referred to in the order, reflects the district court's 
unmistakable intent to enter a partial final judgment under 
Rule 54(b), nothing else is required to make the order 
appealable. We do not require the judge to mechanically 
recite the words `no just reason for delay.' " Id. at 1220. 
Unlike Carter, the Fifth Circuit's holding in Kelly does 
establish the proposition on which Berckeley and Shoreline 
must rely in support of their argument that this Court has 
jurisdiction. 
 
Further examination of the district court's holding in 
Kelly demonstrates that the circumstances supporting 
jurisdiction in that case are not comparable to those 
presented here, and therefore we do not address whether 
this Court should adopt the Fifth Circuit's holding in Kelly.7 
(Text continued on page 13) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In doing so, we concurred with other courts of appeals that have 
considered the question. See Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 
114 F.3d 162, 166 (11th Cir. 1997); Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., 
942 F.2d 34, 39-40 (1st Cir. 1991); Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 
1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 875 
F.2d 1008, 1015 (2d Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 496 U.S. 633 
(1990); Bank of Lincolnwood v. Federal Leasing, Inc., 622 F.2d 944, 948- 
49 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 
7. Indeed, the "touch the bases" approach taken by the Kelly dissenters, 
see Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1223, has merit both because it is consistent with 
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the plain meaning of Rule 54(b) and because it would result in a 
predictable process by which appeals are taken under that rule. See also 
Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1997). That argument 
proceeds from the recognition that Rule 54(b) is a simple rule. Its 
substance is comprised of two sentences. The first sentence details the 
mechanism by which a district court may enter partial final summary 
judgment. A court must make both an "express determination that there 
is no just reason for delay" and an "express direction for the entry of 
judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The word "express" separately modifies 
both the determination of no just cause for delay and the direction for 
the entry of judgment. Black's Law Dictionary defines "express" as 
"[c]lear; definite; explicit; plain; direct; unmistakable; not dubious or 
ambiguous." Black's Law Dictionary 580 (6th ed. 1990); see also Kelly, 
908 F.2d at 1222 (referring to the substantially similar definition in 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary). "Under this definition, 
`express determination that there is no just reason for delay' can mean 
only one thing: The judge's very words must state specifically that he or 
she has decided that there is no just reason for delay." Kelly, 908 F.2d 
at 1222. Thus, the argument proceeds, it is self-evident that the first 
sentence of Rule 54(b) requires an explicit manifestation that the 
district 
court has determined there is "no just cause for delay" and directing the 
entry of final judgment. 
 
The second sentence explains the effect of a district court's failure to 
comply with the mechanism detailed in the first. It begins by stating 
"[i]n 
the absence of such determination and direction," thereby echoing the 
first sentence's requirements of both an "express determination" that 
there is "no just cause for delay" and "express direction" for entry of 
judgment. The second sentence goes on to state broadly that any court 
order that does not comply with both of these requirements "shall not 
terminate the action as to any claims or parties" and the order shall be 
subject to later revision. As the dissent in Kelly notes, the second 
sentence's prohibition applies to all orders, "however designated," 
thereby limiting an appellate court's ability to find alternative indicia 
of 
finality where there has not been strict compliance with the rule. "The 
inclusion of the `however designated' proscription serves to underscore 
the importance of the `express determination' requirement in the [present 
Rule]. The drafters apparently viewed this requirement as absolute -- 
one that could not be circumvented by use of a mere title." Kelly, 908 
F.2d at 1226. Furthermore, while the first sentence permits the district 
court some discretion by stating it "may" enter partial final judgment 
where the two requirements are met, the second sentence's use of the 
word "shall" arguably allows no discretion for an appellate court to take 
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The district court in Kelly was undoubtedly passing on the 
propriety of a partial final summary judgment under Rule 
54(b). The district judge solicited a judgment form pursuant 
to Rule 54(b) from the dismissed defendant, the signed 
judgment was captioned "F.R.C.P. 54(b) JUDGMENT," and 
the order directed "that there be final judgment entered 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) . . . ." Id. 
at 1219. There were thus three indications that the district 
court, though it did not state "no just cause for delay," 
intended to enter a judgment under Rule 54(b). The clarity 
of the district court's ruling was a necessary condition of 
the Fifth Circuit's holding that the absence of an express 
determination of "no just cause for delay" would not defeat 
its jurisdiction. After noting the district court's three 
references to its intent to enter judgment under Rule 54(b), 
the Fifth Circuit stated that "[t]he only question, then, is 
whether this language reflects with unmistakable clarity the 
district judge's intent to enter a partial final summary 
judgment under Rule 54(b). We have no doubt that it does." 
Id. at 1221. 
 
But no indicia of the District Court's intent to enter 
judgment under Rule 54(b) is evident from its rulings in 
this case. The District Court's order does not cite Rule 54(b) 
or discuss its application, but only states that it is granting 
"final judgment" on the claims between Berckeley and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 where those requirements are 
deficient. See Miller v. French, 120 S. Ct. 2246, 2253 (2000) (discussing 
the difference between "shall" and "may" in statutory interpretation). 
 
The Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly held that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, like any other statute, should be given 
their plain meaning. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications 
Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 540 (1991); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel 
Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989); Walker v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980); United States v. Nahodil, 36 F.3d 
323, 328 (3d Cir. 1994). "As with a statute, our inquiry is complete if we 
find the text of the Rule to be clear and unambiguous." Business Guides, 
Inc., 498 U.S. at 540-41. 
 
The manner in which we dispose of this case does not require us to 
address, head on, the issue presented in Kelly . Thus, we leave for 
another day deciding whether the words "no just cause for delay" are 
required in haec verba to confer appellate jurisdiction under Rule 54(b). 
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Colkitt, while holding the remaining claims by and against 
Shoreline in abeyance during a one-year stay. In light of the 
well-known rule that a judgment is not appealable unless it 
terminates all claims, see, e.g. Carter, 181 F.3d at 343, we 
do not take the invocation of the words "final judgment" to 
indicate that the Court intended to grant an appealable 
partial final judgment under Rule 54(b). The sole reference 
to the immediate appeal of its entry of summary judgment 
is the Court's statement that "we do not prejudge any such 
motion" by Colkitt for an interlocutory appeal. Not only 
does this statement disclaim that it is making any ruling at 
all, but it appears to refer to a hypothetical motion 
pertaining to the interlocutory appeal provisions of 28 
U.S.C. S 1292. 
 
The only reference to the application of Rule 54(b) in this 
case is a lone citation to "Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 and 56" 
contained in the motion for the entry of final judgment filed 
by Berckeley and repeated once in its Memorandum of Law, 
and the similarly summary citation in Colkitt's Motion for 
Reconsideration. Given the generality of these references 
and the paucity of any further discussion of the 
requirements of Rule 54(b), we are not persuaded that the 
District Court intended to enter partial final judgment in 
compliance with the dictates of that Rule. The facts of this 
case are in stark contrast to those of Kelly and we are 
unconvinced that the District Court's "language reflects 
with unmistakable clarity the district judge's intent to enter 
a partial final summary judgment under Rule 54(b)." Kelly, 
908 F.2d at 1221. 
 
Even the Fifth Circuit has recognized that the absence of 
an express determination of no just cause for delay cannot 
be excused where it is unclear whether the district court 
intended to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b). 
See Briargrove Shopping Ctr. Joint Venture v. Pilgrim Enters., 
Inc., 170 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 1999). Discussing its holding in 
Kelly, the court concluded that, "[t]he intent must be 
unmistakable; the intent must appear from the order or 
from documents referenced in the order; we can look 
nowhere else to find such intent nor can we speculate on 
the thought process of the district judge." Id. at 539. 
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Indeed, the facts in Briargrove substantially mirror those 
presented here. "Unlike the facts in Kelly , the district court 
nowhere mentions Rule 54(b). And in further contrast with 
the Kelly facts, neither of the parties in the instant case 
submitted a motion mentioning Rule 54(b) to the district 
court." Id. at 539-40 (citations omitted). While the failure to 
mention Rule 54(b) will not, by itself, defeat jurisdiction 
under that section, United States v. Ettrick Wood Prods., 
Inc., 916 F.2d 1211, 1217 (7th Cir. 1990), where there is a 
concurrent failure to make an express determination of no 
just cause for delay, we cannot reasonably conclude that 
the District Court intended to enter a partial final judgment 
pursuant to that Rule. 
 
We are buttressed in this conclusion by the absence of 
any indication, in a colloquy with counsel or written 
document (order, memorandum or opinion), that the 
District Court was considering any of those factors relevant 
to Rule 54(b), particularly those factors related to whether 
there was a justifiable cause for delay. See Briargrove, 170 
F.3d at 540 ("the district court in this case did not issue 
any orders or memoranda discussing the substantive 
concerns surrounding a Rule 54(b) certification"). We 
announced an illustrative list of Rule 54(b) factors in Allis- 
Chalmers Corp., including: 
 
       (1) the relationship between the adjudicated and 
       unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need 
       for review might or might not be mooted by future 
       developments in the district court; (3) the possibility 
       that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider 
       the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or 
       absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result 
       in set-off against the judgment sought to be made final; 
       (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and 
       solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, 
       frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. 
       Depending upon the facts of the particular case, all or 
       some of the above factors may bear upon the propriety 
       of the trial court's discretion in certifying a judgment 
       as final under Rule 54(b). 
 
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 521 F.2d at 364 (citations omitted). 
While the consideration of these factors is not a 
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jurisdictional prerequisite, see Carter, 181 F.3d at 345, this 
case illustrates why explaining the relevant factors in 
determining that there is no just cause for delay has the 
importance we attributed to it in Allis-Chalmers . Without 
the District Court's consideration of the relevant factors, we 
find ourselves as frustrated as Berckeley and Shoreline, for 
we, as much as they, want to reach the merits of this 
appeal by Colkitt, who now finds it to his strategic 
advantage to undermine his own appeal by delaying any 
decision on the merits. But we are stymied because we are 
unable even to assess whether the District Court evaluated 
those factors that might show no just cause for delay. 
 
As an example, were we to assume the District Court 
intended to enter judgment under Rule 54(b), we would find 
little on the current record that would allow us to review 
whether the District Court properly made that judgment. 
While there was some general discussion of the relationship 
between the adjudicated claims of Berckeley and Colkitt 
and the unadjudicated claims involving Shoreline, and the 
District Court did comment on the effect of partial final 
judgment on the remaining claims, none of those 
discussions was in the context of the application of Rule 
54(b). Furthermore, there was no analysis of the particular 
factors relating to whether just cause for delay existed, 
including "whether the claims under review [are] separable 
from the others remaining to be adjudicated and whether 
the nature of the claims already determined [is] such that 
no appellate court would have to decide the same issues 
more than once even if there were subsequent appeals." 
Carter, 181 F.3d at 346 (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 
U.S. at 8). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has held that, in the 
absence of a statement of reasons explaining the entry of 
partial final judgments under Rule 54(b), it will not accord 
deference to the district court's determination of the issue. 
Corrosioneering, Inc. v. Thyssen Envtl. Sys., Inc. , 807 F.2d 
1279, 1282-83 (6th Cir. 1986). We will similarly not accord 
deference to the District Court where it has not announced 
that there is "no just cause for delay" and did not consider 
those factors relevant to this inquiry. Indeed, it can hardly 
be said that we must accord deference to the District Court, 
given our doubt that the Court ever intended to enter a 
partial final judgment under Rule 54(b). 
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Thus, we abstain from considering the merits of the Fifth 
Circuit's position in Kelly until an analogous case, one in 
which there is an unmistakable intent to enter judgment 
under Rule 54(b) but no express determination of"no just 
cause for delay," presents itself. For purposes of Colkitt's 
appeal, we cannot say that the District Court's orders show 
any such unmistakable intent. We therefore find the appeal 
premature until the District Court enters final judgment as 
to all parties and claims or chooses to make an express 
determination that there is no just cause for delay of the 
appeal of the entry of summary judgment. We leave this 
determination in the capable hands of the District Court, 
"the one most likely to be familiar with the case and with 
any justifiable reasons for delay." Bank of Lincolnwood v. 
Federal Leasing, Inc., 622 F.2d 944, 948 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(citing Mackey, 351 U.S. at 437). 
 
* * * * * 
 
For the reasons noted above, we dismiss this appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction and remand to the District Court for 
further proceedings. 
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